There is only “Philosophy”: The case of testimony by Freschi, Elisa




There is only “Philosophy” 




The present introduction summarises the debate on the epistemological value 
of testimony, with a special focus on the reductionism vs. antireductionism 
polemics, and situates Indian philosophers within it. One thus sees that some 
Indian philosophical schools (especially Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist epistemology) 
attempted to reduce testimony to another, more fundamental, instrument of 
knowledge, typically to inference, whereas others (especially Mīmāṃṣā and 
Nyāya) emphasised the independent nature of testimony. The study then moves 
to the problem of the criteria for a reliable speaker and discusses border-line 
cases, such as that of speaking instruments (computers, clocks and the like). 
Finally, it looks at some promising and open-ended topics evoked by the Indian-
European dialogue on testimony. 
 
 
1. General introduction to the series1  
Ideally, the panel which lies at the basis of the present collection is the first of a series of panels 
dedicated to the purpose of doing “Just philosophy”. I chose the topic of the epistemology of 
testimony because it is one of the fields where a comparison can be fruitful and where the way for 
this interaction has already been paved (see next section). A further step within the same enterprise 
is the series of articles edited by myself and Malcolm Keating which is appearing at regular intervals 
on Journal of World Philosophies.  
 
2. A short prehistory of the current debate  
The field of the epistemology of testimony is both ancient and new in European and Anglo-American 
philosophy. Given that testimony is unavoidable (we acquire from testimony most of our cognitions, 
starting with our name until what most of us know about the Higgs boson), one can find scattered 
remarks about it all over the history of philosophy, especially in the contexts of the philosophy of 
language, of hermeneutics and of epistemology, not to speak about its treatment in the legal theory. 
                                                             
 
1 I am grateful to Roy Tzohar for his comments on an earlier draft of this introduction. 
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However, until relatively recent there was little specialised literature about it. Apart from the 
“classical” opposition between David Hume (1711–1776) and Thomas Reid (1710–1796), only a few 
author such as Elizabeth Fricker (apart from her PhD thesis, Fricker 1986, one might read Fricker and 
Cooper 1987 and Fricker 1982) and Antony Coady (see most of all his ground-breaking and thought-
provoking Coady 1992) wrote about the epistemology of testimony before the mid-1990s.2 
What worked as a catalyser for the launch of the epistemology of testimony was, in my 
reconstruction, the volume edited by Arindam Chakrabarti and Bimal Krishna Matilal (who died 
before the volume could be finished) in 1994 with the title Knowing from words (Matilal and 
Chakrabarti 1994)3. Matilal and Chakrabarti managed to gather some of the most interesting 
Analytical philosophers and to have them reflect on a topic which is central in Indian philosophy but 
was less so in European and Anglo-American philosophy. Ideally, the volume was meant as a dialogue 
of Indian and Anglo-American analytical philosophers, along the lines of a previous attempt, namely 
the volume Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective (edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal and 
Jaysankar Lal Shaw in the same prestigious Synthese Library, in 1985). The volume contributed to the 
establishment of the epistemology of testimony as a separate field of epistemology. For instance, 
Elizabeth Fricker’s essay in the volume, programmatically entitled Against Gullibility has been quoted 
in the great part of the subsequent articles on testimony4 as the paradigmatic instantiation of local 
(or ‘minimal’) reductionism (about which, see infra, section 3). Further, it has contributed to the 
attempts to establish a dialogic contact between Indian and Anglo-American epistemologies (see, e.g., 
Arnold 2001, reworked into the part two of Arnold 2005, where Kumārila’s and Alston’s views are 
discussed side-by-side). Nonetheless, it cannot be said that it really launched a long-lasting new way 
of looking at epistemology.  
Among reasons for the partial failure of the 1994 volume to establish a dialogue about the topic 
one might mention the traditional closure of Classical Indian philosophy (as it is practised until now), 
the symmetrical closure of Analytical philosophy to whatever comes from distant times (and 
languages), but perhaps also the fact that a corpus of Indian philosophical texts accessible to non-
                                                             
 
2 A longer list should include also articles dealing with related subjects, such as Lackey 1999, Welbourne 1979 (transmission 
of knowledge); Hardwig 1991, Ross 1986, Webb 1993 (trust); Burge 1993 (communication). 
3 Note that Matilal and Chakrabarti managed to gather contributions from Coady, Fricker, Welbourne and from other 
authors who had not yet written specifically on the topic of testimony but kept on doing it after 1994, such as K. Lehrer, J. 
McDowell and J.N. Mohanty. Furthermore, they persuaded already influential philosophers such as G.G. Brittan, M. 
Dummett, P.F. Strawson and S. Bhattacharya, to deal specifically with the issue. 
4 And this in many different languages and philosophical contexts. See, only exempli gratia, Böhm 2006, 23–25, 31; Origgi 2006; 
Lackey 2008, chapter 5; Schindler-Wunderlich 2008, 92 and chapter 2.4.7; Brito 2012, chapter 2; Kornblith 2013, 214.  




Sanskritists (or non-Tibetologists, non-Pālists, etc.) is still lacking. Thus, when, e.g., a European 
philosopher after having read Sibajiban Bhattacharya’s fascinating essay wants to dwell further in the 
topic of Indian Logic, she has little to refer to.  
The present working group, consequently, aims at working further in the direction of creating a 
philosophical dialogue on the topic of the epistemology of testimony, with some special focuses:  
• We are doing “just Philosophy”, i.e., the philosophical questions should be on the foreground, 
whereas the historical context, the textual material and other philological issues are discussed 
insofar as they are functional to a deeper philosophical understanding  
• Our work must be soundly grounded in texts and in their history, so that readers can verify 
what we say and continue our research  
• We are committed to highlight points of contact but also differences, so that the dialogue can 
be a really enriching experience and not a chance for European and Anglo-American philosophers to 
see that Indian philosophy was “almost as good” as their own one (cf. the concern of the Indian 
philosophers writing in English and never being “good enough” for Westerners to be considered as 
their peers, Bhushan and Garfield 2011, xiv)  
• The Philosophical enterprise is not limited to the European and Anglo-American world, but the 
inclusion of Classical Indian philosophy should also not be enough to content us (in other words: we 
are not lobbying for Indian philosophy to be admitted within philosophy, but for philosophy to be 
enriched through new questions and perspectives, wherever they come from). 
 
3. Introducing the debate 
3.1. Reductionism and Anti-reductionism  
The topic of testimony is of central importance in several domains. In Europe, it has been dealt with 
— well before it became a distinct philosophical topic — within Legal thought, History (since in both 
cases the role of the witness is central) and Bible exegesis. In India, it is noteworthy that before it 
crystallised into a certain pattern, the topic of testimony had already a long history (in the 
dharmaśāstra context, in the Mīmāṃsā exegesis, etc.). For instance, before the main exponents of the 
Buddhist epistemological school ruled out testimony from the number of epistemological 
instruments (on this topic see Krasser 2012) the value of the Buddha’s word had already been the 
object of a complex exegesis (see, on this topic, Tzohar’s contribution to this volume). This early 
history of the reflection on the topic of testimony left long-lasting traces on its later development 
(for instance, in Europe the centrality of the role of the witness, in India the importance of exegesis, 
see Eltschinger 2013).  
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However, after a certain point, the debate on testimony started being dominated, both in Indian 
and in European philosophy, by some basic dichotomies. First comes the dichotomy between 
reductionism and anti-reductionism. The first aims at reducing testimony to other instruments of 
knowledge. In India, this has meant trying to reduce it to inference, whereas in Europe “reductionists 
argue that the epistemic status of testimony is ultimately reducible to sense perception, memory and 
inductive inference” (Lackey 2008, 141). The difference is less broad than one might think, given that 
the role of perception (of the heard words) and of memory is not denied in Indian philosophy but just 
thought to be not problematic (like the fact that smoke is perceived in the case of the inference of fire 
from smoke does not invalidate its inferential status).  
In Europe, David Hume has been considered the herald of “global reductionism”,5 whereas 
Elizabeth Fricker is, among others, credited to have introduced “local reductionism” into the debate. 
In India, Buddhist Pramāṇavāda authors and Vaiśeṣika champion the view that testimony is a subset 
of inference but both try to reduce particular instances of testimony to particular inferences and 
never attempt the global reductionism endorsed by Hume (i.e., since we have seen again and again 
instances of testimony matching with reality, we can globally trust testimony because of inductive 
reasons, see Hume 1977, 74). Buddhist Pramāṇavādas and Vaiśeṣikas (and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā 
authors, who only accept the Veda as an autonomous source of knowledge and reduce ordinary 
communication to inference) have different ways to reduce testimony to inference. As will be 
discussed below by Alessandro Graheli, part of the problem relies in the difficulty of construing a 
valid syllogism in the case of testimony. If, as one might be inclined to do and as the Vaiśeṣikas tried 
to do, one construes linguistic expressions (śabda) as probans for the probandum, i.e., their meaning 
(artha), then what would be the locus (pakṣa)? An alternative route would be the following chain of 
syllogisms:  
X says that p  
if X says that p, then X wants to express (vivakṣa ̄) p, because he uttered it (from language to 
thought)  
if X wants to express p, then p exists in the world, because X is a reliable speaker (āpta) (from 
thought to ontology)  
thus, p  
                                                             
 
5  However, Aleix Gelfert noticed that Hume’s reductionism is in fact far from being global and that such reconstructions are 
chiefly based on his critique of miracles and not on his assessment of everyday communication, see Gelfert (2010).  




In this case, one needs to have already secured the information that X is a reliable speaker, due 
to previous instances of her reliability.6 
By contrast, Thomas Reid is probably the best known pre-modern anti-reductionist in Europe. In 
his An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764, the only critical edition is 
Reid 1997) he explained that we do not have to construe inferences in order to believe what we are 
said. By contrast, God has instilled in us two principles, the Principle of Veracity, which inclines us to 
tell the truth, and the Principle of Credulity, which inclines us to believe what we are told. The 
success of testimony as instrument of knowledge depends on these two and not on any inferential 
process. In India, the Mīmāṃsā school is radically anti-reductionist, whereas the case of Nyāya is 
more complex and will lead me to highlight some fundamental differences between the European and 
Anglo-American epistemological debates and the Indian one.  
 
3.2. At mid-way: the case of Nyāya 
In India, the epistemological debate necessarily includes the question as for the source of the validity 
(prāmāṇya) of a cognition. Is this extrinsic (paratah ̣) or intrinsic (svatah ̣)? If the former, a cognition 
depends on something else in order to become knowledge. If the latter, every cognition is by itself 
and by default entitled to be called knowledge, unless and until the opposite is proved. In Western 
terms one might say that this last position is akin to falsificationism.  
It is easy to see that Mīmāṃsā, being an upholder of intrinsic validity, can neatly maintain that 
testimony does not need anything else to be considered valid. The situation is slightly more 
complicated in the case of Nyāya, which upholds the extrinsicity of validity in the case of all 
cognitions. Thus, all cognitions need an additional reason to be considered valid, be it the validation 
through another instrument of knowledge (e.g., X through sight sees his father speaking, then the 
validity of this visual perception is confirmed by the auditory perception of his voice) or through the 
awareness of some additional qualities of the source (e.g., X knows that his eyes are in excellent 
conditions because of a recent sight-test and his father is not too far nor in bad light). Testimony is 
                                                             
 
6 The topic of the complex task to be faced by Indian reductionism is admirably dealt with by John Taber, see Taber 1996. Its 
critical review (Siderits 1998) does not deal with Taber’s reconstruction of the reductionist’s strategies.  
 
 
Elisa Freschi – There is only “Philosophy”  
146 
 
not an exception to this and stands in need of a further validation, typically through the additional 
quality of having been uttered by a reliable speaker (a ̄pta).7 
What differentiates the Nyāya position from the chain of syllogisms described above in the 
previous section? According to Nyāya, the reliability of the speaker is an additional quality of the 
source, it is not the probans of an inference. By contrast, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā authors maintain that, 
whenever one hears someone uttering “p” the natural power of language to communicate a meaning 
(a natural power which remain undisturbed in the case of the Veda) is interrupted by one’s suspicions 
concerning the reliability of the speaker, so that one needs to rapidly go through the syllogistic 
sequence described above. By the time the natural communicative power of language is finally 
restored, one already knows that p and, hence, the linguistic communication only repeats something 
already known and does not deliver any new information independently of inference. In Anglo-
American terms, the Reductionist Thesis requires that there “wouldn’t be any difference between the 
epistemic status of the testimonial belief being reduced and the positive reasons doing the reducing” (Lackey 
2008, 151), but this is exactly the case with Nyāya, where the reasons for believing that X is a reliable 
speaker are not the same for believing the content of what X says.  
 
4. The reliability-problems 
4.1. Valid testimony grounded on the author or on language itself  
This leads me to a further dichotomy, the one concerning, among anti-reductionists, the justification 
of testimony. In India, this basic dichotomy can be summarised through the positions, once again, of 
Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. The former makes the validity of testimony dependent on the validity of its 
source (which should be a reliable speaker).8 The latter, by contrast, considers testimony per se valid, 
due to the natural communicative power of language itself.9 In this sense, what Mīmāṃsā speaks 
about can be hardly described as “testimony”, since the role of the witness (testis in Latin) is not at all 
needed. The Sanskrit term, shared by all philosophical schools of Classical Indian philosophy, namely 
                                                             
 
7 Thus, of the two questions Lackey uses to identify reductionists and antireductionists, Nyāya authors answer yes to the 
first and no to the second: “[F]irst, are positive reasons necessary for acquiring testimonially based knowledge and, second, 
are the epistemic properties of such knowledge —such as justification and warrant— ultimately reducible to the epistemic 
properties of purportedly more basic sources, such as sense perception, memory, and inductive inference? Reductionists 
answer affirmatively, while nonreductionists respond negatively, to both of these questions” (Lackey 2008, 141).  
8 This scheme includes also the position of Buddhist Pramāṇavādins, who can accept testimony as a valid testimony only if 
uttered by a reliable speaker, and of many other Buddhist authors, see Tzohar’s contribution in this volume.  
9  A somehow related position is Bhartṛhari’s one, see Ferrante’s contribution in this volume. 




śabdapramāṇa ‘language as an instrument of knowledge’, is more neutral and made me prefer the 
somehow longer paraphrase “Linguistic Communication as an instrument of knowledge”, which is 
more neutral than “testimony” as for the role of the speaker. Thus, in the following I will shift to this 
term.  
Coming back to the dichotomy just exposed, many Medieval Islamic authors explicitly endorsed 
the former view, although the dominant Sunni views regarded (Qur’ānic) language as an eternal 
attribute of God, thus in some way considering it as pre-existing any human communicative act. This 
principle was particularly important to the Ẓāhirī school, leading the Ẓāhiriyya to a strict textual 
interpretation of the Qur’ān, one which presupposed that God had expressed Himself completely and 
perfectly in the text and that one needed not to look for His intentions beyond it — a position which 
interestingly enough resembles the Mīmāṃsā approach to Vedic exegesis.10 In European and Anglo-
American philosophy, contemporary authors like Michael Dummett (Dummett 1994), Józef Maria 
Bocheński (Bocheński 1974, see Rostalska’s contribution in the present volume), Jennifer Lackey (e.g., 
Lackey 2009) and Sanford Goldberg (e.g., Goldberg 2013) uphold the former view, whereas authors 
such as Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer have highlighted the priority of language over 
the speaker and can thus be considered closer to the latter scheme.11 
 
4.2. Linguistic Communication grounding the other instruments of knowledge? 
A step further is that of Bhartṛhari, who criticises inference, deemed not to be a valid source of 
knowledge in the case of non perceptible items (see the next chapter concerning the opposition 
among fields of knowledge) and presents language as an all-pervasive reality. Going in this direction, 
one might even hypothesise that the very direct perception depends on linguistic communication, 
since there is no non-discursive direct perception and our perception is always a perception of 
something we can recognise/think of/describe linguistically. Consequently, Linguistic 
Communication as an instrument of knowledge can evolve in an underlying prasiddhi, the discursive 
knowledge which everyone shares, so that no precise source can be pinpointed. How do we know, 
                                                             
 
10 I am grateful to Marco Lauri for interesting discussions on this topic. Mistakes remain entirely mine. 
11  This is partly an oversimplification since it neglects the distinction (about which see the Introduction in Matilal and 
Chakrabarti 1994) between śabda ‘language’ and śabdapramāṇa ‘language as an instrument of knowledge.’ In other words, the 
fact that an author emphasises the independence of language from a speaker does not automatically mean that she would 
subscribe to the idea that also language as an instrument of knowledge is independent of a speaker. However, for historical 
reasons (see above, beginning of section 3.1.), the debate about testimony in Europe has the witness as its centre and in this 
sense Gadamer’s and Heidegger’s positions are already strikingly audacious.  
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e.g., that we need to eat in order not to die out of starvation? Not through specific scientific studies 
(which at most can be used to justify such notion) and not even through specific directives. Rather, 
according to prasiddhi, explains Abhinavagupta in the XXIV chapter of his Tantrāloka. In this way, 
Bhartṛhari and later Abhinavagupta revert the (European?) idea of “instinct:” it is not a (mysterious) 
non-conceptual instinct which enables us to do things we have not explicitly been taught to do, but 
rather a conceptual knowledge which is so common that we are not aware of how we acquired it 
(perhaps in a previous life, adds Abhinavagupta).  
 
4.3. Criteria for a valid speaker (and listener)  
Embracing the Nyāya scheme leads to a further question, namely, what are the criteria to identify a 
reliable source? Typically, Nyāya authors say that she must be competent (she must have had direct 
experience of what she speaks about), honest and moved by the desire to speak. All three criteria may 
be debated. The former because, as it is formulated in Nyāya, it rules out the possibility of a chain of 
transmission of testimony (which is, by contrast, accepted and praised in Islamic thought, see Lauri’s 
contribution in the present volume). Why should not one accept a chain of witnesses? In the case of 
Indian philosophy, and especially of Nyāya, the problem might have to do with the fact that in this 
case the role of memory would become unavoidable. And memory as an active faculty (i.e., not as a 
sheer repository of notions) cannot be admitted among instruments of knowledge, since it is often 
unreliable.12 
Beside that, what else is implied by the requisite of competence? A possible output of this 
requisite is the idea (explicit in Bocheński) that one’s linguistic communication can be a valid 
instrument of knowledge only in the case that the linguistic communication’s field overlaps with the 
field on which we have a specific epistemological competence. In other words, being a world-expert 
of nuclear biology does not mean that one is a world-expert of science in general. More interestingly, 
the field of what is does not overlap with that of what has to be done (see below, end of this section), 
so that an expert able to describe what has happened (e.g., a historian who has been able to 
reconstruct all stages of a certain recent war) will not necessarily be also able to prescribe what 
                                                             
 
12 A further argument (suggested during the final round table of this panel by Artemij Keidan) is that through history 
linguistic expressions see their meanings changed so that a chain of transmitters testifying that “X is p” would end up 
testifying something else due to the fact that “X ” and “p” may have acquired a new meaning. But such considerations 
cannot play a role in the a-temporal perspective of Mīmāṃsā and I do not know of any such discussion in Nyāya or Buddhist 
Pramāṇavāda either.  




should happen next. This opposition is of fundamental importance in Mīmāṃsā (for which only the 
Veda can be an independent source of knowledge regarding what has to be done), whereas Nyāya 
authors do not see an a priori irreducible distinction between the two fields. The author of the Veda, 
for instance, is described by Nyāya authors as being necessarily omniscient since he has uttered also 
the Āyurveda, whose validity is extrinsically tested.13 
The second criterion, that of the sincerity of the speaker, may also be debated, because it leads 
to the problem one might label as “the misled lier”, i.e., to cases in which someone wants to lie but 
happens to say the truth by mistake. Is the cognition one acquires in this case valid? Since it lacks one 
of the criteria for validity, one should be forced to say that it is not, although it is in itself identical 
with a genuine piece of information (about the problem of justification in Nyāya, see Sibajiban 
Bhattacharyya’s contributions). Further, how is one to judge of sincerity? If it is defined as 
conformity to one’s beliefs, this can lead to further problems. In fact, even if one does not want to 
renounce to justification and is ready to reject the misled lier’s testimony as a case of knowledge-
communication, one might still be puzzled by the case of a speaker who erroneously believes that p, 
but has good reasons for conveying s and does so (e.g., he believes that the Eiffel Tower is left from 
his standpoint, but after looking at his map he decides to tell to the questioning tourist that it is at his 
right, and rightly so). This second speaker is a reliable speaker, although he does not believe what he 
is saying. Within contemporary epistemology, also Jennifer Lackey has discussed interesting 
examples of people who do not believe what they are saying and are nonetheless reliable witnesses 
(in her case: a biology teacher who teaches evolution although she believes in creationism) and has, 
accordingly, stated that “the proper focus in the epistemology of testimony should be on what 
speakers say, not on what they believe” (Lackey 2008, 141).  
The latter criterion is particularly intriguing to me because I have only found it in Indian 
philosophy and in Bocheński 1974 (see Rostalska’s contribution in the present volume).  
Until now I have briefly outlined the requisites of the speaker. A related problem might be that 
of the requisites of the hearer (see Sudipta Munsi’s contribution in the present volume).  
Further, how would such criteria fit in the case of non-descriptive statements? In which sense is 
one’s “competence” involved when uttering a valid command? Bocheński’s distinction between an 
                                                             
 
13 For the Nyāya-Mīmāṃsā debate about this topic see Freschi and Graheli 2005. Franco 1997 explains that Buddhist 
Pramāṇavādins adopt the Nyāya approach.  
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epistemic and a deontic authority (which independently repeats the sādhya-siddha opposition typical 
of classical Indian debates) might be of help here.  
Similarly, also instances of non-informative statements should be separately dealt with. When, 
for instance, Jennifer Lackey lists among cases of “testimony” “reports about the time of the day, 
what one had for breakfast, the achievements of one’s children, whether one’s loved one looks 
attractive in a certain outfit, the character of one’s political opponents, one’s age and weight, one’s 
criminal record and so on” (Lackey 2008, 147), she is in fact listing many cases of speech acts which 
are not meant to be primarily informative but have rather different purposes. For instance, speaking 
about how attractive one’s husband looks might be meant to convey that one is in love with him to a 
flirting colleague, talking about one’s children could be a way to bond with other parents and so on. 
Therefore, such speech acts should not be subsumed in the set of testimonially conveyed knowledge.  
 
5. The hermeneutical problems  
By contrast, if one assumes, as Mīmāṃsā authors do, that language by itself communicates, unless 
and until this communication is blocked by external factors (such as unreliable speakers), one is 
confronted with a different set of problems. First of all, does the fact that the text (oral or written) is 
in itself communicative legitimate any possible reading of it? Few philosophers have embraced this 
position in Europe and no one —as far as my knowledge reaches— in pre-contemporary India. Thus, 
in both scenarios the acknowledgement of the communicative power of the text has rather led to an 
inquiry into the exegetical rules needed to undercover the right meaning(s) of the text. In some cases, 
exegesis has been used also by thinkers upholding the idea of a reliable author as the foundation of 
Linguistic Communication, in cases where such an author was too remote to speak for himself and 
one needed to reconstruct his intent out of the text only (see Tzohar’s contribution for the case of the 
Buddha).  
 
6. Further problems and applications  
Ideally, the trans-philosophical debate should be able to creatively approach also new topics, which 
are not part of each tradition’s background. Among such problems there is the following one:  
• Can one speak of linguistic communication as an instrument of knowledge also in the case of 
non-conscious communicators?  
Indian authors tend to be consistent in maintaining that linguistic communication needs to 
happen through spoken language. Writing is, by contrast, a case of inference since one infers out of 




the written signs their spoken form. This idea can be historically explained also through the fact that 
silent readings was not used in Classical India and that one, indeed, used to pronounce aloud what 
one was reading. Given the changed historical conditions, one might hold nowadays a different 
opinion about writing, even more so since also in the case of writing one can usually identify a source 
and discuss its reliability. The case of non-conscious sources is more complex. I suspect that Classical 
Indian authors would believe clocks and thermometers to deliver information just like gestures do, 
i.e., by delivering inferential signs of something else. In other words, if I am not wrong, we know that 
it is 8 am after having seen our watch because we infer this information from the position of the hour 
hand.14 But what about the case of a voiced clock actually pronouncing the words “It is 8 o’clock”? If 
one were to refute to it the status of being an instance of linguistic communication, then, what would 
be the difference between this case and the case (described by a well-known anti-reductionist, A. 
Coady) of a unknown voice in a call centre who informs us about how much we need to pay for our 
phone bill? The person who is communicating it to us is just reading the information from a 
computer monitor and is hardly performing anything more than an automatic answering machine 
would have been able to do.  
 
The working group whose results are published here convened within the forth Coffee Break 
Conference (and then again in Athens in 2015), but the topic of Linguistic Communication has been 
discussed also within the previous one (CBC 3). This has led me to consider the use of linguistic 
communication as an instrument of knowledge in extra-philosophical fields, such as the usage of 
witnesses in anthropology, development studies, history, statistics, law and the like. It is my hope 
that a thorough reflection about it will take place in a close future, in order to investigate the basis of 
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